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Abstract
Self-employment grants and employment subsidies are active labor market programs that aim
at helping unemployed workers to escape unemployment by becoming self-employed or being
hired at an initially reduced cost for the employer.
In Sweden in the 1990’s the participation rate in the self-employment program increased from
virtually none to almost same as in the employment subsidy program. The advancement of the
self-employment program is likely to be a result of (i) a change in the labor market program pol-
icy, and (ii) an increase in the supply of skilled unemployed workers. The justification for the
policy change is unclear, however. The literature indicate that a rather specific group of unem-
ployed workers may benefit from self-employment programs; Neither are there any strong rea-
sons to believe in general that self-employment should be preferable to conventional employment
through subsidies.
We examine, ex post, the justification for the policy change by comparing the post-program
duration of employment for the two programs. In addition, we focus in some detail on the out-
come for female workers and workers of foreign citizenship. The reason for this is the explicit
policy to direct those workers to self-employment.
The data we study are the inflow to the two programs from June 1995 to December 1996. The
program participants are followed to March 1999. The data contain detailed spell and back-
ground information on 9,043 unemployed workers who participated in the self-employment pro-
gram and 14,142 who participated in the employment subsidy program.
The second explanation, see (ii), for the increase in self-employment program implies a poten-
tially serious selection problem. We discuss how the selection process may bias the effect esti-
mate in the non-linear duration model that we use. Simulations help us to determine the magni-
tude of the selection bias in our application. Moreover, we exploit the existing behavioral hetero-
geneity across labor market offices to reduce the selection bias.
We find that the risk of re-unemployment is more than twice as high for the subsidized em-
ployment program compared with the self-employment program. The large positive effect is,
however, limited to male and female workers of Swedish origin. We thus conclude that the policy
change in general has been successful, though we note that directing immigrant workers to self-
employment is unlikely to improve the situation for this group of unfortunate workers on the
Swedish labor market.
Keywords: Empirical Bayes methods, Employment duration, Program evaluation, Proxy
variables, Selection bias, Simulations
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1. Introduction
The self-employment program provides a mean for Swedish unemployed to escape
unemployment by setting up their own business. To be eligible for such grant it is re-
quired that the worker is registered as unemployed and the Labor Market Officials ap-
prove the proposed business plan. The self-employment program (hereafter the SEMP-
program) can be compared to subsidizing workers’ initial spell of employment (SUBE-
programs), where in principle the programs differ only in the employer.
In the 1990's, the number, as well as the proportion, of unemployed workers who re-
ceive self-employment grants has increased drastically
1. The increase reflects most likely
a change in the labor market policy rather than a shift in the preferences among the un-
employed workers. For example, before 1993, the self-employment program was an al-
ternative that was considered only after having participated in other programs. In 1993
the self-employment program was given priority, a policy change that is likely to have
raised the participation rate.
Another possible explanation to the rise in SEMP-participation is the increase in un-
employment for skilled workers. Figure 1 shows the Swedish (total) unemployment rate
and the entering rate to the SEMP-program during the period 1985-1997. The Labor
Market Officials have met the increase in the unemployment rate in the 1990s by in-
creasing proportionally the supply of programs, the program-to-unemployment ratio has
been about one third over the period 1985-97. The figure shows that the increase in
SEMP-participation coincides with the increase in overall unemployment. Consequently
the new SEMP-participants come from a larger stock of unemployed. This stock has
better skills on the average than previously and we also believe this to be a reason for the
increased likelihood of entering self-employment. The idea that a larger stock of unem-
ployed has better skills on the average is for instance supported by the fact that the aver-
age education level among the unemployed has risen considerably during the 1990s.
2
Also, the SEMP-program is probably directed to more skilled workers since the
                                                       
1 It is estimated that currently 30 per cent of all new born Swedish firms are owned and run by this
group of workers (Statistics Sweden, 1998).
2 See for example Edin and Holmlund, (1994), p 16.2
program is more demanding than other programs. If the typical SEMP-participant is
more qualified than other program participants, then we may face a serious selection
problem. This will be discussed in Section 3.3.
 The objective of this paper is to compare the efficiency of the self-employment pro-
gram with the traditional subsidized employment program and therefore evaluate the


















Figure 1. Swedish (total) unemployment rate and the SEMP-program’s share of all labor
market programs during the period 1985-1997.
Some Swedish experience indicates that subsidized employment programs, as well as
other traditional programs, work rather poorly for immigrant workers - a group of work-
ers who have a disproportionate high rate of unemployment. For various reasons it has
been argued that the immigrants might perform relatively much better through self-
employment programs compared with, e.g., subsidized employment programs. Indeed, it
has been an explicit goal of the labor market policy to direct unemployed immigrants to
self-employment (Riksdagens Revisorer, 1997). For instance, immigrants may have their
grant period extended to 12 months instead of the usual duration of 6 months. We will
for this reason in some detail examine whether in fact this has been achieved and if it has
had the expected positive result.
3 Women is another group that can have their grant peri-
ods’ extended to 12 months. We therefore also check the outcome for women.
                                                       
3 It is not obvious what definition of immigrants should be used. In this study we use foreign citizenship.3
We attempt to study the success of the policy regarding self-employment and subsi-
dized employment among unemployed workers by examining the risk of re-
unemployment for workers who entered the programs under the period June 1995 to
December 1996. Our definition of a successful outcome - not returning to unemployment
- is justified by the belief that holding a job is drastically better than being unemployed,
whichever type of employment it may be.
4 
5 There are some compelling reasons to be-
lieve in such a claim, the foremost important one is that most parts of the Swedish Work
fare system presupposes employment, e.g., pensions, subsidized day care, unemployment
and health insurance. An alternative approach in this kind of study, is to focus on the
program effects on future wages. We had no possibility to study future wages in our data
set. Furthermore, the expressed goal of the labor market policy is to reduce the registra-
tion periods at the unemployment offices and therefore we stick to this outcome meas-
ure.
The relevance of this paper extends beyond the Swedish case as many OECD coun-
tries provide the self-employment program to unemployed workers (OECD, 1995). The
OECD report shows that the participation rate
6 in self-employment programs ranges
from 0.5 to 4 percent, for various OECD countries, with a median rate of approximately
2 percent. The question is however, if unemployed workers would benefit more by being
hired by an external employer than being self-employed.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a background to the Swedish
active labor market policy, and discuss in some detail the setting for the two competing
programs and show the historical evolution of the programs. In section 3 we present the
statistical methodology and describe the data used in the empirical analyses. We also
examine the determinants of the choice of program to participate in and, finally, we dis-
                                                                                                                                                                  
We are well aware that immigrants may receive Swedish citizenship, but due to limited data we could
not discriminate between these citizens.
4 A positive secondary effect of the self-employment program would arise if the self-employed hired
other unemployed workers. We are abstracting from this effect because of some evidence that the effect
has historically been small in the Swedish case (Riksdagens Revisorer, 1997) (US studies have found
both a positive and a negligible effect, Vroman, 1997).
5 Commonly the firm survival rate is reported (OECD, 1995). It seems, however, reasonable to consider
the transition from self-employment to regular employment as a successful outcome, thus shifting the
focus from firm survival to the attachment to the self-employment/employment state.
6 The rate is calculated as the number of individuals receiving the self-employment grant divided by the
number of individuals receiving regular UI benefits.4
cuss selectivity issues. Section 4 gives the results and section 5 ends the paper by a dis-
cussion of side effects and results.
2. Additional background information and the institutional setting
Sweden has traditionally attempted to fight unemployment by active labor market
policy. A cornerstone in the policy has been the National Labor Market Board (AMS),
and its local offices, which has had many measures to its disposal to reduce unemploy-
ment, e.g. labor market training. The offices also monitor the unemployment insurance
system. Consequently, detailed records of all unemployed have been kept
7. Furthermore,
it is mandatory for employers to report vacant positions to the office, and hence infor-
mation on job-matches ought to be well recorded.
8
It appeared for many years that the Swedish policy was successful in keeping a low
unemployment rate, however, in the early 1990’s unemployment rose. In the end of the
1990’s the unemployment rate still remains high by Swedish standards. The question is
whether labor market programs have succeeded in reducing unemployment. Given the
empirical facts presented in Figure 1, one might be tempted to answer ‘no’ to this ques-
tion. However, many would attribute the failure in reducing the unemployment rate to
the lack of demand for labor caused by a drastic reduction in governmental spending,
(see Modigliani et al, 1998). We will not focus on the question whether labor market
programs in general are effective. Instead, we will compare the  programs self-
employment grants and subsidized employment and measure their relative effectiveness.
It is sometimes argued that unemployed are the least likely in the labor force to suc-
ceed as self-employed. On the other hand, US evaluations of self-employment programs
to dislocated workers show that the program can be quite successful, at least for the spe-
cific subgroups of unemployed workers that the program historically has been targeted to
(Katz, Stanley, and Kruger, 1998 and Vroman, 1997).
9 US evaluation studies based on
experimental data and data from ‘natural experiments’ also suggest that subsidized em-
                                                       
7 A validation study by Statistics Sweden (1993) shows that more than 90 percent of those who self-
reported as unemployed in the labor force surveys in August-October 1992 also registered at the public
employment agency.
8 About 15 per cent of the workers is lost to follow up. It is estimated that about 50 per cent of those
actually was lost because of employment (Bring and Carling, 1998).5
ployment programs are effective if they are targeted at specific groups of unemployed
workers. There are also some non-experimental European studies of subsidized employ-
ment programs. The German study by Kraus et al. (1997) and the British study by Payne
et al. (1996) both indicate positive results for the programs. In the German study, the
studied outcome is non-employment hazard and the British evaluation studies the em-
ployment rate.
Table 1. Background information about the self-employment program (SEMP) and
the subsidized employment program (SUBE).
Program: SEMP SUBE
Unemployment compensation:
Eligible to UB 80% of earlier income,
max 580 SEK/day
Collective agreement
Eligible to CA 240 SEK/day Collective agreement
Not eligible 103 SEK/day Collective agreement
Type of activity/employment: %
a
retail trade 32 23
consulting services 23 18





cost/participant & month 10.300 SEK 8.400 SEK
Stock of  participants
b 10,000 15,000
Duration of program, months
c 6 4-6
Note: (a) Åtgärdsundersökningen 1998. (b) The figures correspond to the fiscal year 1994/95. (c) Some
statements from the unemployment offices are that the duration of the SUBE-program sometimes de-
pends on whether the employer seems serious in his intentions of a post-program employment or not. If
not, i.e. if the office suspects that the employment will not continue after the subsidized period, the pro-
gram duration might be shorter. For women and immigrants participating in the SEMP-program, the
program period may be extended with 6 months.
To be eligible for the SEMP- grant it is required the worker is registered as unem-
ployed and that the labor market officials approve the proposed business plan. The grant
is provided for six months and is the equivalent of 80 per cent of the pre-unemployment
                                                                                                                                                                  
9 Wong et al (1998) find an overall positive effect of the Canadian self-employment program, but the
effect varies over subgroups of participants.6
earning if the person is entitled to unemployment benefit. As is shown in Table 1, the
maximum amount of unemployment benefit is 580 SEK per day and if the person is enti-
tled to cash assistance, CA, he receives 240 SEK per day and if he is not entitled to any
unemployment income (UI) he receives 103 SEK per day.
Concerning the SUBE-program, it is also required the worker is registered as unem-
ployed and the program is approximately of the same duration as the self-employment
program. Participants in the SUBE-program are paid according to the collective agree-
ment. The employer is compensated with a maximum of 350 SEK per day or at most 50
% of the wage cost. If the person is only entitled to CA or is not entitled at all, the reim-
bursement can be higher for those participating in the SUBE-program than for those in
the SEMP-program. On the other hand, the SEMP-grant is of course a minimum income
since the business may generate some additional income. We believe it is a reasonable
approximation to say that the participants of both programs will earn about the same.
For the SEMP-program, the majority types of activity for which the firms were regis-
tered are retail trade (32 %), consulting services (23%), personal and cultural services
(20%) manufacturing (10%) and construction (10%). For the SUBE-program, most jobs
are in the private sector and the largest fraction is found in retail trade, (23%), thereafter
follows manufacturing, (22%) and consulting services (18%).
10
The government expenditure for the SEMP-program was about 10.300 SEK per par-
ticipant and month, while for the SUBE-program the equivalent cost was 8.400 SEK.
11
Table 1 provides an overview of the key features of the two programs.
Figure 2 shows the entering rate to the self-employment program. The rate is calcu-
lated as the number of workers entering the program, during a given year, divided by the
sum of the workers entering the self-employment program and the subsidized employ-
ment program during the same year. As time has progressed, the self-employment pro-
gram has increased its share from zero to about 40% of these two programs and the
question is whether this is a well justified progress.
12
                                                       
10 Åtgärdsundersökningen 1998.
11 The figures correspond to the fiscal year 1994/95.
















Figure 2. Entering rate to the self-employment program, calculated as the number of
workers entering the program, during a given year, divided by the sum of the workers
entering the self-employment program and the subsidized employment program during
the same year. The figure shows the rate for the period 1985 to 1997.
There is a fundamental question: Are the two programs comparable? The idea of run-
ning a business on the one hand, and being an employee on the other, the differences
seem more significant then the similarities.  This is a general problem when it comes to
evaluating labor market programs. However, when looking at how the two activities are
implemented as programs, we find that the comparability grows. The duration of the
programs are the same, the reimbursements are approximately the same and most im-
portantly, there is the fact that both programs involve employment that is intended to last
even after the program period ends. In this view, we argue that if the SEMP-program is
to be compared to any program, the SUBE-program is the most natural choice.
Another fundamental question is whether participants in the SEMP-program are com-
parable to the participants in the SUBE-program. Tables 2a-2b give background infor-
mation about the participants. Most striking is the difference in educational level and
work experience between the two groups. Such differences might lead to selection bias
in the empirical analysis and the issue of the next section is to explore how this bias can
be made miniscule.8
Table 2a. Descriptive statistics for the participants in the self-employment program. The
variables used in the empirical analysis enters the table.
Variable Mean St Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Age (in years) 36.8 11.6 18 27 36 46 66





Dur. of unemp. prior to pro-
gram, days/100
5.11 5.29 0 .980 2.98 7.86 40.6
Educ. and work experience
Compulsory school .278 .201
Upper sec. (Max 2 years) .231 .178
Upper sec. (> 2 years) .238 .181
University  (Max 2 years) .070 .065
University  (> 2 years) .183 .150
No work experience .143 .122
Some work experience .128 .111
Long work experience .730 .197
Unemployment compensation
Eligible to UI .329 .221
Eligible to CA .081 .075
Not eligible .590 .242
ln(Wage)
b 3.83 3.26 0 0 6.31 6.60 8.47
Daily allowance, SEK/day 305 239 0 0 383 563 580
Citizenship:
Swedish .917 .076
Western Europe .032 .031
Eastern Europe .021 .020
Asia, Africa, South America .031 .030
Local labor market structure
ER
c .094 .063 0 .054 .080 .109 .340
Herfindahl’s index
c .076 .015 .053 .065 .073 .082 .181
Note: (a) Earlier program participation =1 if the person has only been in the job-seeker categories 11-14
before participating in the actual program. (b) ln(wage) : the wage variable comes from the event table
AKSTAT. It is expressed as the logarithm of  the daily wage in SEK and refers to the wage the person
had during the period preceding the unemployment period. (c) See Section 3.3.9
Table 2b. Descriptive statistics for the participants in the subsidized employment pro-
gram. The variables used in the empirical analysis enters the table.
Variable Mean St Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Age (in years) 37.1 11.5 18 27 37 46 66






Dur. of unemp. prior to pro-
gram, days/100
6.53 5.37 0 2.04 5.03 10.1 59.4
Educ. and work experience
Compulsory school .279 .201
Upper sec. (Max 2 years) .227 .176
Upper sec. (> 2 years) .373 .234
University  (Max 2 years) .040 .038
University  (> 2 years) .081 .074
No work experience .317 .217
Some work experience .217 .170
Long work experience .466 .249
Unemployment compensation
Eligible to UI .370 .233
Eligible to CA .142 .123
Not eligible .488 .250
ln(Wage)
b 3.12 3.24 0 0 0 6.46 8.40
Daily allowance, SEK/day 265 229 0 0 245 494 580
Citizenship:
Swedish .821 .147
Western Europé .039 .038
Eastern Europé .103 .092
Asia, Africa, South America .037 .036
Local labor market structure
ER
c .090 .059 0 .049 .080 .109 .340
Herfindahl’s index
c .078 .014 .053 .067 .074 .083 .181
Note: (a) Earlier program participation =1 if the person has only been in the job-seeker categories 11-14
before participating in the actual program. (b) ln(wage) : the wage variable comes from the event table
AKSTAT. It is expressed as the logarithm of the daily wage in SEK and refers to the wage the person
had during the period preceding the unemployment period. (c) See Section 3.3.10
3. Methods and data
In this section, the method and the data we use to study the effect of the SEMP-
program relative to the SUBE-program will be discussed. We also derive the determi-
nants of the program participation and define a variable, which will serve as a proxy for
unobserved factors. The intent is to reduce the potential selection bias.
3.1 Methods
The construction of the programs implies that a spell of employment will proceed the
program. The question is to what extent the programs are successful in providing long-
term employment. The worst case would be that the programs are immediately followed
by re-unemployment.
13
Let the random variable  e T  be the employment duration, be that also employment at
other employers than the one of the program, until the individual returns to unemploy-
ment. Let also D take on unity if the individual participated in the SEMP-program and
zero if the individual participated in the SUBE-program. In general, the key parameter to
identify, assuming a homogeneous effect, is
(1) [ ] D te / Pr ,
which sometimes is simplified in empirical analysis to be the expected value of the distri-
bution,  [ ] D t E e / . We prefer however to consider the hazard rate,  [ ] D te / l , which is
equally general to (1) since the hazard has a simple relation to the probability distribu-
tion. The relation is









/ Pr 1 ln
/ l .
                                                       
13 Interrupted program spells are uncommon, perhaps reflecting the fact that neither the employee nor
the employer has any incentives to terminate the employment prior to its end. Hence, we will discard
information on the duration of the programs.11
We prefer the hazard function because of its natural appeal in studies of duration phe-
nomena. The relative effect of participating in the SEMP-program could be determined
as
(3)  [ ]













and if this ratio is constant for all values of  e t , it would be sufficient to identify
( ) e t a a ” .
It is however likely that there are other factors that determines  e T  and that the pro-
grams are heterogeneous with respect to these factors. An appropriate analysis requires
that these factors are controlled for and we therefore extend the hazard in (2) to include
such factors:
(4) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) W = ; , , , , , , , / 0 v z y x m t t v z y x D t e e e l a l
where  ( ) e t 0 l  is a baseline hazard and  () . m  is some function which links the factors to the
duration variable. We think of x as attributes of the individual, y as regional factors that
may effect the duration, z as structural features of the local labor market, and v
14 as re-
sidual factors that we can not control for. Finally, W is a vector of parameters associated
to the factors.
It is necessary to put additional structure to (4) before proceeding to the final empiri-
cal analysis. We begin by considering the parameter  ( ) e t a . In figure 3, the empirical haz-
ards for the two programs are shown. It can be noted that the hazard for the SEMP-
program is monotonically decreasing, whereas the hazard for the SUBE-program rises
initially before starting to fall. We will, nevertheless, impose the restriction that
( ) e t a a =  neglecting the initial departure from a time-constant ratio.
15
                                                       
14 It is our hope that the heterogeneity arising from v is small, though we can not emprirically determine
whether it is small or not. In Section 3.3 we discuss how a proxy for v can be obtained.
15 Some exploratory analyses where we accounted for a time-varying ratio confirmed that the imposed




















Figure 3. Empirical hazard for the duration of employment, conditional upon survival the
first 20 days. The solid line shows the hazard rate for participants in the SUBE-program
and the dashed line the rate for the participants in the SEMP-program.
The second step is to disclose the functional form of  () . m . Duration data and duration
models are difficult in this sense.
16 We prefer to perform the preliminary data analysis on
the complete observations, i.e. for those the actual duration was observed. Selecting the
covariates in Table 2a-2b and linking these to the duration variable has been done with
the help of exploratory tools for ordinal and categorical variables and a number of non-
parametric regressions for the continuous variables.
17 This decision has been a compro-
mise between the desire to reach effective linking and to restrict the number of parame-
ters. After these two steps we can specify (4) as
(5) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) v g z y x t v z y x D t e e L + A + B = * * * exp , , , , / 0 al l
                                                       
16 Altman and de Stavola (1994) provide a careful discussion on available techniques.
17 Exploratory tools for ordinal and categorical variables are treated by Hoaglin, Mosteller, and Tukey
(1985). For literature on non-parametric regressions, see Cleveland (1979), Cleveland, Devlin, and
Grosse (1988), and Härdle (1990).13
where B, A, and L  are parameters associated to the three types of factors and an aster-
isk, *, denotes the transformed version of the factors. This model, which is of the semi-
parametric Proportional Hazard type,
18 can now be estimated by use of the principle of
Maximum Likelihood, provided that  v is eliminated.
3.2 Data
A comparison of the two programs requires a sample containing spell information as
well as background information on the participants. Moreover, it is necessary to obtain
information on the subsequent unemployment spells. To achieve this, we rely on several
merged databases maintained by the Labor Market Board. From these databases we have
event history information on the transitions between the states of unemployment, labor
market training and employment, as well as individual specific information of dem o-
graphic and financial type, and weekly unemployment earnings.
We have collected information on all individuals who commenced one of the two pr o-
grams in the period June 1995 to December 1996, provided that they were in their first
registration period at the unemployment office. We follow these individuals until they
once again register as unemployed at labor market office or, at the most, until March
1999. The spell information is retrieved from a database maintained by the Labor Market
Board, known as HÄNDEL. We use the database to determine, in addition to back-
ground information on the individual, the unemployment duration prior to the date the
program commenced and to determine the duration of the program, as well as the dur a-
tion of the employment that succeeds the program.
Information on working hours, unemployment benefits, and income prior to une m-
ployment is obtained by additional merging to data maintained by officials for the une m-
ployment insurance system, a database known as AKSTAT.
After deleting aberrant observations we have data consisting of 23,185 individuals,
where 14,142 participated in the subsidized employment program and 9,043 in the self-
employment program. Table 2a-2b gives sample statistics for the program partic ipants.
Due to the sampling scheme, it is inevitable that some observations will be inco m-
pletely observed. This happen if the individual is still employed at the time we select the
                                                       
18 See Meyer (1990), Narendranathan and Stewart (1993), and Carling et al. (1996) for earlier applic a-14
observations. For those individuals we use the fact that their spells were still ongoing at
the time of censorship.
19
3.3 Selection issues: What determines the program participation?
During the period under study, 39 % of the individuals enrolled the SEMP-program
and 61 % the SUBE-program. According to what rule where these individuals assigned
to one of the two programs? This question needs to be examined for, at least, two rea-
sons; firstly, there is presumably a selection on basis of attributes of the individuals which
might mask the relative performance of the programs, and secondly a heterogeneous
selection process across the local labor market offices might point at administrative ine f-
ficiencies. A problem arises if the administrators fail to predict the outcome of the pr o-
grams or fail to act on basis of this prediction or both. Heterogeneity across offices might
show that some offices are less efficient in predicting and acting on the ou tcome.
3.3.1 The selection bias in a non-linear duration models
Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1998) give an extensive presentation of the potential
selection problem in evaluation studies. Assume a linear outcome model with a homog e-
nous effect, supposedly capturing the effect of moving an individual from the non-
participation state to participation state. The effect will, in general, be over-estimated if
the participation decision is driven by unobserved factors that also are positively related
to the outcome.
 The prediction for linear models does, however, not carry over to our non-linear
model. Rewrite the hazard in (5) so that  V˛(0,¥) represents the combined effect of all
unobserved factors and  X z y x ˛ * *, *, ,
(5a) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )V X t D V X D t e e b l a l exp exp , , / 0 = .
It can be shown, if V is independent of X and D that (see Lancaster, 1990)
                                                                                                                                                                  
tions of this model.
19 In principle, it is possible to distinguish between, for instance, full and part-time unemployment,
hence suggesting multiple destinations after the employment spell. We do not discriminate between
these destinations since the vast majority of individuals returned to full unemployment.15
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exp 1 ˆ lim a b a a .
Thus, in absence of an unobserved selection process, the effect will be underestimated,
unless all factors that determine the duration are controlled for.
 It is clear that the risk of over-estimating the effect, in case the participation decision
is driven by unobserved factors that also are positively related to the outcome, will partly
be decreased by the tendency to underestimate the effect in hazard models. Moreover,
the distribution of  V will in general be right skewed, implying positive dependence b e-
tween the variance and the expectation, which, in turn, would render an even more co n-
servative estimate.









Figure 4. The bias in the effect estimate as a function of the correlation,  rho, between the
V-factor in the Outcome model and the participation model. The dashed line gives the
bias for s=1 and the case where there is no actual effect. The solid line gives the bias for
a similar setting, only that  s=0.5. The dotted line gives the bias for  s=1 and an actual ef-
fect equal to -1.
It is not easy to provide, analytically, narrow bounds for the selection bias, so we r e-
sort to simulations. In Appendix A, we give the details of the simulation experiment.
Figure 4 shows the bias in the effect estimate under various assumptions about the
strength of the unobserved selection process in our application.
The simulations show that the bias can be substantial because of non-random sele c-
tion. We also note that the presence of an actual effect makes the selection bias less16
problematic. The simulations suggest that a bias in the effect estimate exceeding 25 % is
unrealistic, for this to happen it would require the unobserved selection process to be
incompatible with most empirical cross-sectional studies in the economic liter ature.
3.3.2 A proxy for the unobserved heterogeneity, V
In the data we have observations from 463 offices (of the 536 offices in the country),
though many of these offices are, however, small. Figure 5 shows the variation in the
proportion of the SEMP to SUBE participation across offices.
20
















Figure 5. The distribution of the proportion of participants in the  SEMP-program per
office. The solid line shows the estimated distribution before standardization for factors
that might explain the variation, and the dashed line shows the estimated distribution
after standardization. The distributions are smoothed by applying a Kernel density est i-
mator with the Epanechnikov Kernel and a bandwidth, h=0.15 (see  Härdle, 1990).
However, some, or perhaps all, of the variation may occur because of heterogeneity in
the individuals registered at the local offices or geographical or structural heterogeneity.
The purpose of this analysis is to standardize for these factors so that the office specific
variation can be determined.
To do so we apply a logistic regression model to examine the determinants of the
program of participation, and to standardize the participation rate . Formally, again, let  D
                                                       
20 The variation is greatest for small offices, presumably because of random variation rather than sy s-
tematic variation. To adjust for the random variation and to obtain better estimates of the actual office
specific proportion, we have applied the Beta/binomial method in an Empirical  Bayes spirit (see Carlin
and Louis, 1996). The unequality in size is accounted for by the approach suggested in Louis and  Der-
Simonian (1982), (see also Andersson, Carling, and  Mattsson, 1998).17
take on unity if the individual enrolled the SEMP-program and zero otherwise. For the
definition of factors we refer to Section 3.1. The model is expressed as,
(6) [ ]
[ ]
) ; , , (
, , , / 0 Pr
, , , / 1 Pr
ln W + =
=
=
z y x m P
z y x P D




where the discussion in Section 3.1 applies for the  ( ) . m  function and its arguments and
j P  represents the participation rate in the SEMP-program at office  j after standardiza-
tion. The individual attributes,  x, do not need a detailed discussion, we simply note that
we have access to many variables that one would expect to be important.
The regional variable,  y, is the county. We expect this factor to be important for sev-
eral reasons. The offices are autonomous but serve under a county administration. At the
county level policy recommendations and budget restraint are decided upon, hence one
would expect homogeneity of the offices within the county, though not necessarily so
between counties. Moreover, the organization and the culture of Swedish counties sug-
gests that commuting within the county is feasible, but between county commuting infe a-
sible. Thus, we expect the local employers to do most of their recruiting from the work
force in the county. Likewise, we expect the self-employed to primarily view the county
as his home-market (recall from Section 2 that most of the firms were set up in  sectors
which are local to their character). It can also be noted that some macro-variables, for
instance, the unemployment rate varies greatly between counties. This may have an effect
on the propensity to offer different types of programs.
The structural variables,  z, are difficult to measure and to provide a prior belief about.
We consider the Herfindahl’s index (Petersen, 1993), per municipality, of the number of
employed per sector, as one such variable. It appears likely that the diversity of the local
infrastructure may play a role in the propensity to set up a new enterprise. Our belief,
although very weak, is that the less diversified the market the more focused is the office
on serving the main employers with recruits, hence implying that a high  HFI ought to be
correlated with a low proportion of participants in the SEMP-program. We also consider
a measure of the intensity in the job creation and job destruction in the municipality18
where the participant lives,  ER.
21 Again, our priors are weak but perhaps a high intensity
might imply a proneness to endure in risky enterprises and thus imply a high proportion
of participants in the SEMP-program.
Table 3 reports the estimates of the logistic regression model. There are several fa c-
tors increasing the probability of participating in the SEMP-program that concur with
previous findings. Among these are UI-eligibility, long previous work experience, higher
education and a previously high wage. However, it also seems that women and  citizens
from Asia etc. are more likely to enroll in the SEMP-program. Recall from Section 1 that
women and immigrants may have their program period’s extended, i.e., this finding is not
surprising and in the next section we will consider more in detail the outcome of the pr o-
grams for these two groups.
We also note in Table 3 that the z-factors, which were supposed to measure the diver-
sity and dynamic of the local market, entered the model in line with our priors, though
they are unimportant for determining the participation outcome.
In figure 5 the distribution (footnote 20 applies) of the residual office specific propo r-
tion,  j P , is shown. It is evident from the figure that a great deal of the variation in the
program of participation can be attributed to the variation across offices. We suggest
that there are three hypotheses that can be used to explain this variation:
Hypothesis 1. The propensity to offer the SEMP-program is identical in all offices,
i.e.  [ ] [ ] D P D Pr / Pr = . The variation occurs because of unobserved heterogeneity such
that  [ ] [ ] j j P V f P V f j j „ „ , / / . The implication is that  e T  ought to be positively related
to  j P .
22
Hypothesis 2. There is no difference in unobserved heterogeneity in that
[ ] [ ] j j P V f P V f j j , , / / " = . The propensity to offer the SEMP-program varies across of-
fices, i.e.  [ ] [ ] D P D Pr / Pr „ .
23 The implication is that  e T  ought to be unrelated to  j P ,
                                                       
21 ER=(C-D) + | (C – D)| , where C is the ratio of the constructed jobs to the labor force in a municipality.
D refers to the ratio of destructed jobs, see Andersson (1999).
22 Provided, of course, that our presupposition that workers with better unobserved attributes are more
likely to be in the SEMP-program is correct, otherwise the implication would be the other way round.
23 This diversity of strategy might be caused by differences in collected anecdotal evidence, motivating
the office members to systematically lead the individuals into either the SEMP-program or the SUBE-
program according to the preference of the office.19
whereas ( 1 = D Te ) should be negatively related because of a less aggressive screening
process in offices with high  j P .
Hypothesis 3. There is no difference in unobserved heterogeneity in that
[ ] [ ] j j P V f P V f j j , , / / " = . The propensity to offer the SEMP-program is related to the
quality in the program implementation. The implication is that  e T  ought to be unrelated
to  j P , whereas ( 1 = D Te ) should be positively related.
Whichever hypothesis be true, it is clear that the factor should be conditioned on in the
duration analysis. The resulting parameter estimate will give credibility to some of the
hypotheses
4. Estimation and results
In this section we report the empirical results. We estimate the model
(7) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) j e e P z y x t D P z y x D t d l a l exp * * * exp exp , , , , / 0 L + A + B =
where a is the effect parameter of interest and  j P  will, potentially, serve as a proxy for
V. By assuming a piece-wise linear hazard in each time-interval, the discrete time hazard
can be written as
(8)  [ ] ( ) [ ] { } e j e t P z y x D P z y x D t h h d a + + L + A + B + - - = * * * exp exp 1 , , , , / ,
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t
t e dw w t 0 ln l h  and  k D  is the length of the k:th time-interval. We con-
sider intervals of 20 days ranging from zero to 1200 days. The log likelihood fun ction,.20
Table 3. Logistic regression model for participation in the self-employment program,
(SEMP). St. errors in parentheses.
Variable Estimates
Age (<30)
30-39 .082  (.039)
40 - .063  (.036)
Gender (Female=1) .222  (.032)
Disability .038  (.059)
Historical spell information
Earlier program participation .132  (.045)
Duration of unemployment prior to program -.238  (.013)
- squared .010  (.001)
Education and work experience
(Compulsory school)
Upper sec. (Max 2 years) .033  (.041)
Upper sec. (> 2 years) -.251  (.041)
University  (Max 2 years) .630  (.070)
University  (> 2 years) .889  (.052)
(No work experience)
Some experience .212  (.050)
Great deal of experience 1.09  (.041)
Unemployment compensation
(Uninsured)
Eligible to CA .087  (.058)
Eligible to UB .352  (.176)
ln(Wage) -.765  (.091)
ln(Wage)-squared .121  (.012)
Citizenship
(Swedish)
Western Europe -.249  (.081)
Eastern Europe -1.30  (.085)
Asia, Africa, South America .388  (.085)
Local labor market structure
ER .516  (.278)
HFI -.644  (2.89)
-.075 .015  (.059)
.075 - .125 -.123  (.131)
.125 - .444  (.290)
Note: The county factor also enters the model. The estimates for these 21 counties are not shown due to
limited space.21
given the model in (8), for a sample of  n random observations on  e T  and c is
(9)
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where  1 = i c  if the employment was observed to be terminated for a new spell of unem-
ployment and zero otherwise. The function is maximized with respect to its arguments
and the resulting estimates of  B and  d  are presented in Table 4a.
24 Excluded from the
table are y, which is a factor with levels equal to the 21 counties in Sweden, and the
structural variables,  z, which were assumed to determine participation but not emplo y-
ment duration.
25 The results are not surprising , the hazard rate of re-unemployment is
lowest for experienced, well-educated, and middle-aged Swedish men.
To identify the effect parameter we consider several models. In the first simple model
we control only for program participation. We find in this case that  927 . 0 ˆ - = a  implying
a much higher risk of re-unemployment for the participants in the  SUBE-program (see
Table 4b). This effect estimate might however be unreliable due to selection bias. Table
4b shows the effect estimates when the model is stepwise extended to reduce the hetero-
geneity amongst the participants. The effect estimate decreases to  752 . 0 ˆ - = a  in the
most extensive model where the office specific heterogeneity has been  controlled for.
The estimate implies that the hazard rate for re-unemployment is more than 110 percent
higher for the SUBE-program than for the SEMP-program.
Table 4a. Hazard regression model for the employment duration.
                                                       
24  Starting values are obtained from the Approximate Maximum Likelihood method (Carling, 1995),
and used in conjunction with the  BHHH algorithm (see Carling and  Söderberg, 1998).
25 We have performed some additional sensitivity analysis to confirm the results: We have, one at the
time, excluded (i) all workers with reported working disabilities, (ii) workers who had participated in
labor market programs prior to the studied one, and (iii) workers who were not entitled to unemplo y-
ment benefits. The rationale for the latter (iii) is that the uninsured would increase their income rel a-
tively more by entering the SUBE-program and that there are reasons to presume that uninsured workers
are less inclined to report re-unemployment to the labor market offices that administer the records.22








Earlier program participation .138 (.039)
Duration of unemployment prior to program .093 (.011)
- squared -.003 (.001)
Education and work experience
Upper sec. (Max 2 years) .071 (.036)
Upper sec. (> 2 years) .031 (.035)
University  (Max 2 years) -.062 (.063)
University  (> 2 years) -.191 (.049)
Some experience -.017 (.036)
Great deal of experience -.281 (.033)
Unemployment compensation
Eligible to CA .039 (.045)




Western Europé .087 (.066)
Eastern Europé -.136 (.053)




Note: Number of observations in SEMP:9,043 and SUBE: 14,142. The county factor also enters the
model. The estimates for these 21 counties are not shown due to limited space. The reference category is
a Swedish male of less than 30 years who attended only compulsory school and does not receive une m-
ployment income.
(a) See Section 3.3.































To make our results comparable to the evaluation parameter most often applied in the
self-employment literature, we also show the implied survival rates for the two programs.
Our almost four-years follow up gives that about 35 % of the self-employed and 60% of
the subsidized workers have returned to unemployment four years after the program
ended. This figure for the SEMP-program can be compared to previous international
findings which are of similar magnitude (OECD, 1995). We have difficulties in relating
the figure for the SUBE-program to similar studies but the figure appears high, and r e-
mains so even if we leave out the cases where re-unemployment occurred immediately
after the end of the program.
Table 5a. Interaction analysis: Program and Citizenship.  St. errors in parantheses.





















Table 5b. Interaction analysis: Program and Gender.  St. errors in parantheses.









Note: Diff in effect = 0.101 (.057).
Consider next the two subsamples: women and foreign citizens. Table 5a shows the e s-
timated effect for various foreign citizens with respect to Swedish workers. It can be
noted that the large difference between the programs almost exclusively can be attributed
to Swedish workers. The difference between the programs appears small for foreign cit i-
zens, something caused by foreign citizens in the  SEMP-program having a much worse
hazard rate than Swedish workers. Table 5b shows a comparison between men and
women. The effect estimates appear to be quite similar, the difference in effect estimate
is borderline significant but not big enough to rule out the possibility of sele ction bias.24































Figure 6. The survival rate of employment for the programs. The solid line gives the rate
for a randomly selected worker, the dashed line for the average worker who entered the
program.
In the last part of the previous section, we gave three hypotheses indicating how  j P
might be related to the hazard rate of re-unemployment. Table 5c shows the estimates of
the parameters associated with this variable. The estimate for the interaction term ind i-
cates that offices at which the standardized proportion in the SEMP-program is high are
associated with long self-employment duration. Hence, there is support for the third h y-
pothesis. However, there is also support for the first hypothesis, i.e. that the composition
of unobserved characteristics of program participants varies across offices.
Table 5c. Interaction analysis: Program and office specific proportion in  SEMP
Variable Estimate St. error
j P -0.778 (.312)
( ) D P Pj · - -1.40 (.596)
5. Discussion and conclusions
5.1 Side effects25
Previous studies (Riksdagens revisorer 1997) show that the SEMP-program may in-
volve undesired side effects. One such effect arises when the unemployed would have set
up the business even without the self-employment grant. This is called “dead weight
loss”. Since one of the goals with active labor market programs is to reduce the costs
involved with people being unemployed, the dead weight loss can be a substantial dra w-
back to this goal. In the study referred to above, between 40-50 percent of the self-
employed stated that they would have started their firms without the grant.
In this context, one might question whether we can draw any conclusions from this
study, if the objective is to find which of the two programs is the most effective in order
to reduce the costs for the public sector? Here, we would like to point out that a similar
problem is encountered in the  SUBE-program. In this type of program, a displacement
effect and a dead weight loss may occur when someone would have been employed at
the actual moment even without the subsidy. A survey from the Labor Market Board
26,
asked what the participant thought would have happened to his work assignments if
there had been no program. The report shows that 48 per cent thought that someone
(himself or someone else) would have been employed to perform them.
27 The fact that
there is likely to be side effects in both programs makes us believe that this problem can
be overlooked, since this study investigates the relative effects of the programs.
5.2 Conclusions
We have shown that the participation rate in the self-employment program ( SEMP)
has increased between 1985 and 1997, whereas the participation rate in the subsidized
employment program (SUBE) remains stable over the period. We argue that this evolu-
tion, which also has been observed in many other  OECD-countries, is driven by a
change, perhaps reflecting an international trend, in the Swedish labor market policy. It
comes natural to pose the question whether SEMP is preferable to rival programs such
as SUBE, and this is the question we address in this paper.
 We claim that it is reasonable to contrast  SEMP to SUBE since both programs imply
                                                       
26 Labor Market Board Ura 1997:12
27 In another Labor Market Board report, Uuu 1995:1, the employers are asked whether they would have
employed also in the absence of the program and 36 per cent said yes. These 36 per cent in  turn, were
asked if they would have employed the same person and here 56 per cent answered yes.26
an initial spell, with duration of about six month, of subsidized employment, in the first
case through self-employment grants. Furthermore, there seems to be no particular di f-
ferences in the incentives as to participate in either one of the programs (except for those
who do not receive UI benefits).
 We determine the relative efficiency of the programs by comparing the post-program
employment duration until re-unemployment for a large sample of participants in 1995-
1996. The potential self-selection problem, inherent in all evaluation studies based on
non-experimental data, is attacked by controlling for a large set of  confounders and by
using the office specific variation in participation rates as an instrument. Furthermore,
simulations are carried out to check the sensitivity of the results under various assum p-
tions of the selection process.
 We find the risk of becoming unemployed was twice as high in the  SUBE-program
compared with the SEMP-program. We therefore conclude that the policy change that
led to the increase in SEMP-participation was well justified.
 The positive result for the  SEMP-program is however only valid for workers of
Swedish citizenship and therefore, the idea that immigrant workers would perform rel a-
tively better through SEMP-programs than other programs is not confirmed in this study.
 Finally, the selectivity section in the study showed that there is a great deal of vari a-
tion across offices concerning program participation. Hence an attempt to further i n-
crease the participation rate in the  SEMP-program, at least in areas where the program is
presently under-represented, might be worthwhile.27
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Appendix A: Simulation experiment
The model in (5a) can be written as a regression model (see Carling and Jacobson,
1995)
(A1) ( ) ln ln L t D X V e = - - - + a b e ,
where  e  follows the Extreme Value distribution with  [ ] E e = -05772 .  and
[ ] Var e p =
2 6 / . Thus, there are three sources that produce variation in the duration var i-
able. The semi-parametric approach in model (5) prevent us from distinguish the vari a-
tion arising from  V. However, if we assume a functional form for the base-line hazard,
then the three sources can be identified from data. We assume that  T D X V e , ,  follows
the Weibull distribution. In doing so, we find that 15% of the variation is caused by  D
and  X , 55% by e , and the remaining 30% by  V .
We will consider the following Outcome model
(A2) ln ln T D X V e = - - - + a b e ,
and generate data for this model accordingly
(A3) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 , 0 ln ln 50 . 0 , 0 34 . 1 44 . 0 , 0 ln 2 1 U sN N D Te - + - - - = a ,
where  ( ) N  refers to the normal distribution with arguments expectation and variance,
and  [ ] U 01 ,  refers to the uniform distribution over zero to one. Censoring is introduced
by defining  ( ) E T T e 22 . 1 , min =  and  ( ) E T I C e 22 . 1 < = , where E is a unity exponential
variable. This censoring process gives about 45 % censored observations, which corre-
sponds to the censoring degree in our data.
Two things can be noted for this specification, ( i) the effect parameter is set to
1 , 0 - = a , and (ii)  1 = s  corresponds to the variance decomposition above, increas-31
ing/decreasing  s will increase/decrease the association between  Te  and the unobserved
heterogeneity. We consider  1 , 5 . 0 = s .
The likelihood of entering the  SEMP-program will be determined as


















Decomposing the variance sources, leaving the office specific variable out, in the
model in (6), we found that 50% of the variance could be attributed to the observed
factors and, thus, 50% of the variation remains unexplained. Generating  D
* is done ac-
cordingly





* N N N D r r - + + + - = ,
where  r  gives the correlation between the unobserved component in the participation
decision and the one in the employment outcome equation,  ( ) r ˛ 01 , .
Finally, the bias is a function of the three parameters that will be varied in accordance
with the statements above. It is defined as  ( ) Bias c P a r a a , , lim $ = - , where  aˆ lim P  is
the maximum likelihood estimate of the effect, obtained for  n = 500 000 , .
The most interesting results are shown in figure 4. The dashed line shows the bias as a
function of  r  in the case there is no actual effect, i.e.  0 = a , and  1 = s . The bias is, as
expected increasing with  r , though it is of modest size for  5 . 0 £ r . The solid line
shows the results for a similar setting, the difference is that  s is set to 0.5 and conse-
quently the bias is smaller. The  Weibull assumption above is probably producing a too
high importance to V and thus  5 . 0 = s  might be a more realistic value in our application.
Finally, the dotted line shows the bias when there is an actual effect of  1 - = a . Note that
for low values of r  there is a tendency to underestimate the effect. This tendency is ba l-
anced by the selection bias for  5 . 0 = r .